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Dansk Sammendrag (Danish Summary) 
Den danske regering har opstillet specifikke mål for bevarelsen af biodiversiteten i Danmark. Et af 
disse mål er henlæggelse af urørt skov, som indebærer, at skovdriften i form af hugst skal ophøre. I 
2017 oprettedes en tilskudsordning, der skulle kompensere skovejere for tabt indkomst i forbindelse 
med henlæggesen af skov som urørt. I private skove kan dette også foregå gennem opkøb af 
hugstrettigheder. Disse kan opkøbes gennem en såkaldt ’omvendt’ auktion, en licitation, som er en 
auktionsform, der forsøger at skabe de lavest mulige tilbud i en situation, hvor der er én køber (her 
staten) og mange udbydere (her de private skovejere). Dette er i modsætning til en normal auktion, 
hvor man har én sælger og mange købere, der byder, og således søger at opnå den højeste pris for 
den auktionerede vare. Prisen, som en privat skovejer vil kræve for at sælge sine hugstrettigheder, 
vil afspejle ejerens underliggende omkostningsfunktion, som primært er påvirket af den indkomst, 
skovejeren mister, men også af for eksempel de herlighedsværdier, ejeren selv værdsætter, og deres 
fremtidige handlemuligheder. Disse informationer er kun kendt af skovejeren, og denne 
informationsasymmetri vil uundgåeligt lede til en såkaldt ’informationsrente’, som udtrykker 
muligheden for, at skovejeren kan profitere på sin egen viden. Forskellige auktionsdesign adresserer 
muligheden for at nedbringe informationsrenten, og denne rapport beskriver nogle af disse 
auktionsdesign. 
 
Et af de centrale designs kaldes Vickrey-auktionen (second price auctions), hvilket ofte i omvendte 
auktioner, licitationer, benævnes som en ’første afviste pris’ auktion (first rejected price). Ved 
denne auktionsform bliver alle tilbud rangeret efter pris, og der tilbydes købskontrakter fra den 
billigste ende, indtil køberens budget er opbrugt. Alle udbydere bliver betalt den samme pris, og 
svarende til tilbudsprisen fra den første afviste udbyder. Dette design kan opstilles, så det sikrer, at 
tilbudsgivere ærligt fortæller den mindste pris, de er villig til at sælge til. Men denne ærlighed 
kommer blandt andet, fordi den ensartede betaling indebærer til tider betydelige informationsrenter 
for de mest omkostningseffektive. 
 
Et alternativ er den såkaldte prisdiskriminerende auktion (discriminatory price auction), hvor de 
udvalgte udbydere betales den pris, de hver især har forlangt. De udbydere, der ved, at de kan 
tilbyde en konkurrencedygtig pris relativt til deres kvalitet for eksempel, har således et incitament 
til at tilbyde varen til en højere pris end den laveste pris, de er villig til at acceptere, og således høste 
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informationsrente. Alligevel kan designet være mere omkostningseffektivt samlet set, hvis blot 
ejernes overbud ikke overstiger den pris, der ville være resultatet af en ’første afviste pris’-auktion. 
 
For danske skovejere er træarten, boniteten og den stående vedmasse de væsentligste kilder til 
variation i den mistede produktionsindtægt ved udlæg af urørt skov. Samtidig er disse parametre tæt 
knyttet til de beskyttelsesmæssige karakteristika, som man ønsker at opnå ved urørt skov. Dette 
forhold indikerer, at man bør benytte en form for vægtning eller segmentering af udbyderene i 
auktionen. Hvis alle skovtyper omfattes i én enkelt auktion, vil resultatet kunne blive, at der kun 
indkøbes hugstrettigheder fra billige elle- eller askeskove og/eller skove på dårlig bonitet. 
Endvidere vil stor variation i omkostningerne betyde, at de udbydere, der kan tilbyde en lav, 
konkurrencedygtig pris, vil høste informationsrente, hvis ikke auktionsdesignet tager højde for disse 
systematiske variationer i omkostninger. 
 
Andre kvalitetsparametre, for eksempel forskellige biodiversitetsmål, som beskrevet rapporten, kan 
være vigtige for det miljømæssige udbytte og dermed omkostningseffektivitet. Nogle af disse 
parametre vil være kendte på forhånd af køber, andre vil være ukendte. Især håndteringen af den 
rumlige afhængighed af de miljømæssige værdier er vanskelig. Rapporten beskriver en såkaldt 
’yard stick’-algoritme, som er resultatet af forskning i efficiente indkøb af goder med mange 
forskellige karakteristika, og rapporten beskriver, hvordan denne algoritme kan benyttes i auktioner, 
hvor indkøber kun har lidt eller måske ingen information tilgængelig om godet ex ante. Algoritmen 
kan også anvendes til at reducere nogle af incitamenterne til at give tilbud med priser over den 
sande minimumspris. 
 
Rapporten illustrerer også, ved hjælp af eksisterende data over den rumlige fordeling af skovejere, 
indikatorer for biodiversitet og venteværdier af modne bevoksninger, hvordan forskellige 
hovedantagelser kan påvirke resultatet af en omvendt auktion. Endelig beskriver rapporten 
forskellige forhold, der kan påvirke deltagelsen i en auktion, og hvordan disse kan imødegås. 
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Summary 
The Danish government has set specific goals for setting aside forest land for biodiversity purposes 
in the form of untouched forests, where no production forestry operations can be undertaken. Part of 
these goals will be fulfilled on public and state owned forest land, and parts will be fulfilled on 
private lands. Setting aside forest land as untouched with the restriction that no further harvest can 
take place implies the loss of future income from forestry net of related forest operation costs and in 
2017 a support grant scheme was designed and implemented to compensate forest owners for their 
forgone income. In private owned forests the government can terminate normal forestry operations 
by purchasing the right of harvesting from the forest owner. These rights can be offered to the 
government on a basis, which resembles a reversed auction. A reverse auction seeks to generate the 
lowest possible offers of purchasing price for an auctioned good in a situation where there is one 
buyer (in this case the government) and many sellers (forest owners) in contrast to a ‘normal’ 
auction that seeks to reveal the highest selling bid for an auctioned good in a situation where there 
are many buyers and only one seller. 
 
The price a forest owner will ask for selling harvesting rights is driven by the forest owner’s cost 
function of conserving forest land, notably the forgone income, but also amenity values or option 
values will influence their reservation price. This information is private to the forest owner, and 
such an asymmetry of information will inevitably lead to paying what is termed information rents. 
A key feature of (reverse) auction design is to address the issue of asymmetric information, through 
inducing competition among (sellers) buyers. 
 
The report reviews different auction formats. One of these is the so-called second price auction 
mechanism, which in procurement auctions is often called the ‘first rejected price’ mechanism. 
Here, all offers are ranked and contracts signed from the cheapest end until the desired quantity is 
obtained or the budget exhausted. All the suppliers are paid a uniform price equal to the offer of the 
first rejected supplier. The design ensures sellers will state their true minimum price, but this comes 
at the cost of paying information rents. An alternative design is the discriminatory price auction. In 
a discriminatory price auction the selected participants are paid the price they state in their offers. 
This auction design may encourage agents to pursue information rents by offering their product at a 
higher price than their minimum reservation price, especially if the agents believe they are 
competitive in terms of cost to quality. However, if the overbidding still results in prices below 
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what would be the ‘first rejected’ uniform price, the design is overall competitive even if true costs 
are not revealed. 
 
For Danish forest owners, a substantial part of the overall variation in costs relates to tree species, 
standing volume and site quality, which suggest that segmentation and weighting could be 
considered in designing a reverse auction, either ex ante or in the selection algorithm ex post. If all 
forest types are handled in one auction, with no weighting or segmentation, most of the contracted 
forest land will likely be low cost alder or ash type of forest and/or on poor soil. Furthermore, cost 
variation could result in rather high information rents for forest owners offering low cost forest 
types, if the auction design does not take these systematic differences into account. 
 
But other quality parameters, e.g. various biodiversity measures as described further in the report, 
may be considered important for the quality and value of the environmental outcome. Some of these 
will be known to the buyer and some will be unknown. Especially, the handling of spatial co-
dependence of environmental values of land offered is difficult to handle. The report examines 
research in efficient multi-attribute procurement that has addressed the potential for applying 
pricing methods that can resolve procurement auctions with as little a priori information collection 
as possible, yet still handle the fact that cost information is private to suppliers adequately. 
Specifically, the use of data envelopment analysis for yard stick pricing in procurement auctions is 
being studied. 
 
The report also illustrates the influence of some of the key considerations for a cost-effective 
design, using existing data of the spatial distribution of forest owners, biodiversity indicators and 
the capital value of mature forests to analyse four possible designs. Finally, it is essential for reverse 
auctions to reach an adequate level of participation from landowners in order to obtain the desired 
environmental effect and to secure competition. Consequently, the report concludes by examining 
potential barriers for participation. 
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1. Introduction 
The Danish government has set specific goals for biodiversity conservation in forests. Part of these 
goals will be fulfilled on public and state owned forest land, and parts will be fulfilled on private 
lands (Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet 2016). This report focuses on the private land. An efficient 
way to achieve these goals is setting aside forest land in the form of untouched forests, which 
implies that harvesting of timber can no longer be undertaken (Petersen et al., 2016). Setting aside 
forest land as untouched with the restriction that no further harvest can take place implies the loss of 
future income from forestry net of related forest operation costs. For the forests on private land, the 
government can compensate forest owners for their forgone income. A support grant scheme was 
designed and implemented in 2017 to compensate private landowners for their foregone income and 
other costs of setting aside forest land as untouched (Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet 2017). But, 
other factors than forgone income might influence the forest owner’s cost function of conserving 
forest land, for example amenity values or option values. Information about forgone income and 
other influential factors are, however, private to the landowner, and this asymmetry of information 
will inevitably lead to the agency paying information rents. One way to reveal this is by looking at 
the problem of compensating forest owners for foregone income as an issue of buying the right of 
harvesting from the landowner – potentially through an auction. The literature on auction theory 
suggests different ways to reduce this information rent and increase efficiency when implementing 
grant schemes. 
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2. The origin of procurement auctions theory  
The literature on the use of reverse auctions for procurement problems is large and diverse, due to 
the diversity in practical contexts of procurement implementations. Basically, an auction seeks to 
reveal the highest selling bid for the auctioned good in a situation where there are many buyers and 
one seller. The reverse auction seeks to generate the lowest possible offers of purchasing price for 
the auctioned good in a situation where there is one buyer (in our case the government) and many 
sellers (forest owners). In this report, we consistently use the term ‘offer’ as indicating the wanted 
price from contractors in a reverse procurement auction. In some parts of the literature the word 
‘tender’ is used synonymously with ‘offer’. 
 
At the root of the literature is the quest for methods to secure cost efficient procurement outcomes 
ensuring that the production of each specific type and quantity of goods is allocated to the producers 
that can supply the goods in demand at the lowest aggregate cost. 
 
The seminal paper by Vickrey (1961) set the benchmark for how to approach the design of auctions 
and evaluate their outcomes, upon which also the design of reverse auctions in procurement cases 
builds. A key feature of auction design is to address the issue of asymmetric information. 
Specifically, in the case of procurement auctions, the general case is that from the buyer’s point of 
view, there is private information about the production costs of the seller. The primary function of 
the auction is therefore to reveal enough information from sellers to reduce potential rents from 
such information. The revelation mechanism is an auction design, which places sellers in a 
competition situation where their optimal strategy is to submit offers that are as truthful as possible. 
Such a mechanism is called an incentive compatible mechanism. 
 
Vickrey (1961) proposed the so-called second price auction mechanism. He shows that under 
standard assumptions and for a homogenous divisible product, a second price auction mechanism 
will secure Pareto-optimal outcomes. Simply put, all bids for a good is ranked and the bidder 
offering the most is allowed to buy the good, but is only asked to pay the second highest bid. This 
means, in the context of a normal auction, that the good is sold to the buyers valuing the good the 
most, and that for all bidders, truth telling is a weakly dominant strategy: Submitting a bid below 
your willingness to pay implies running a risk of bidding just below the highest bid, which in turn 
means missing out on a gain. 
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In procurement auctions this form of auction is often called the ‘first rejected price’ mechanism, and 
here the most cost-effective producers are contracted. The simple mechanism requires the buyer to 
outline the price setting mechanism prior to any offers being placed. The pricing mechanism is that 
all offers are ranked and contracts signed from the cheapest end until the desired quantity is 
obtained or the budget exhausted. All the suppliers are paid a uniform price equal to the offer of the 
first rejected supplier. It can be proven that for a sufficiently large number of suppliers, the best 
strategy for any supplier is to report truthfully on their cost and hence make offers according to their 
forgone benefits. It can also be shown that neither buyer nor suppliers need spend resources on 
guessing the cost functions of others or the benefit function of the buyer. In the following we 
provide an in-depth explanation of the basic features of the reversed auction. 
 
2.2 Basic features 
The core feature and promise of the use of reverse auctions and similar instruments is the use of 
competition among agents for a profit, in terms of an informational rent, to improve coordination. 
We will use Figure 2.1 to illustrate these concepts. 
 
We illustrate the potential difference between the current support scheme, where forest owners are 
compensated based on a model of the present value of their specific forest production potential, and 
a first rejected price type reverse auction. Thus, in the current support scheme, the compensation 
paid is external to the assessment of the forest owner and the forest owners’ own preferences, 
including potential private amenity values or other aspects. Of course, the forest owners’ decision to 
sign up is not external to their perceptions of costs and possible payments. 
 
In Figure 2.1, the bars represent five examples of forest owners coming forward and receiving 
payments per hectare as indicated by the height of the bar for an area indicated by the width of the 
bar. Thus, the bar area represents the payment made. We return to the reason for the different 
colours below. 
 
The smooth curve in Figure 2.1 represents a sorting of all the relevant forest land held by forest 
owners according to the forest owners’ own perception of the costs to them of setting the forest  
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aside as untouched. Thus, this takes into account possible private benefits (or additional costs) from 
this action, enjoyed by the forest owners. In a first rejected price auction, where forest owners know 
they will receive the same payment as everyone else, provided their offer is below the price, the 
rational forest owner will state their true costs as their offer. Turning in an offer understating their 
true cost increases the probability of being selected, but only if the final price is below their true 
cost – and hence understating their cost implies only a risk of a loss. Overstating the cost does not 
affect the final price they will get, and hence their profit, but it does reduce the probability of being 
selected. Thus, overstating reduces expected returns. 
 
There are two reasons why a first rejected price auction will enhance efficiency relative to the 
current scheme. 
 
The first is coordination. Note that there are forest owners with fairly low perceived costs, who have 
not come forward and thus do not appear in Figure 2.1. That may be because the current scheme 
will only just compensate their costs, or perhaps pay below their true costs if they have a forest of 
low production value, but have other cost concerns. If a budget corresponding to the area under the 
yellow or blue dashed lines is available, then forest owners revealing true perceived costs below 
those lines will have an incentive to enter, because they will all be paid the price indicated by the 
dashed line. That means they earn an information rent equal to the distance between the dashed line 
and their part of the curve. If forest owners are rational, all – not only some – of those with low true 
opportunity costs will come forward. That means that we do not allocate any funds to buy forest 
from the forest owners behind the two highest bars. They are competed out of the artificial market. 
 
The second reason why efficiency may be improved is that it relies on forest owners’ own perceived 
costs and not an external estimate; that means private benefits from the action are taken into 
account. We see from the relationship between the bars and the curve that the two red bars illustrate 
cases where the forest owners perceive the costs to be lower than the external estimates – they earn 
a very high information rent. Under the auction, they will be paid a lower information rent – if they 
are even selected. On the other hand, the three blue bars indicate cost estimates closer to the true 
cost, in which case information rent is not paid at all. 
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The yellow dashed line approximately indicates a market where the same forest land area (x-axis) is 
bought under the auction as in the case where we buy the forest land area indicated by x-axis width 
of the bars. Thus, we see that under an auction we can contract the same land area at a much lower 
budget (area under the yellow dashed line), when compared with the current compensation scheme 
(area of bars); simply because forest owners willing to offer up expensive forest land are not 
contracted. The blue line shows the case, where we use a budget equal to that of the sum of the bars, 
but in an auction setup. The result is that more land is contracted, for the same budget. 
 
Number of hectares of similar environmental quality 
Figure 2.1 Illustrating potential gain in efficiency from competition in terms of coordination improvement subject to 
payment of information rent; relative to current compensation schemes where owners are compensated according to 
an external cost estimate. The curve illustrates owners’ land areas sorted according to owners’ own perception of 
costs. Bars represent examples of forest land being compensated according to external cost estimates. The height of 
the bars indicates payments per hectare for an area indicated by the width of the bar and thus the bar area represents 
the total payment made. The two red bars illustrate cases where the forest owners perceive the costs to be lower than 
the external estimates offered to them. Area under dashed flat lines illustrates the same amount bought (yellow line) 
or the same budget used (blue line) for the price indicated by the line. 
 
 
An often applied alternative to the first rejected price auction, where all selected participants are 
paid the same price, is the discriminatory price auction, where selected participants are paid the 
price they state. This auction design will encourage agents to offer a product at a higher price 
compared to, in particular, agents who believe they are low cost and competitive, attempting to 
secure information rents. Nevertheless, if the offered price is not too high, it may still be a more 
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efficient scheme as illustrated in Figure 2.2, where the information rent transfer to owners is 
reduced by the amount A. 
Numerous papers since Vickrey (1961) have developed models and designs for contexts where the 
basic premises differ. To mention just a few: cases where the buyers are procuring products with 
multiple attributes in iterative learning and offer processes (Parks and Kalagnanam 2005), where 
single sourcing or multiple suppliers are used, with or without fixed quantity tenders (Dasgupta and 
Spulber 1989) as well as equilibrium effects of procurements systems on e.g. suppliers’ investments 
in cost reduction measures (Arozamena and Cantillon 2004). Numerous variants have been studied 
empirically in lab experiments (Kwasnica and Sherstyuk 2013), in stated preference surveys and in 
field experiments as we turn to below. 
 
 
 
Latacz-Lohmann and Hamswort (1997, 1998) analysed various aspects of introducing procurement 
auctions into agri-environmental schemes and discussed the possible short-comings of the second 
price auction when the products procured are not homogenous and may differ in quality. They 
suggested that some form of discriminatory pricing may be better, if legally and ethically possible, 
and reduce rents even if offers would not be entirely truthful. Ferraro (2008) provides an overview 
D
K
K
/h
a 
Number of hectares of similar environmental quality 
 
A 
A* 
Figure 2.2 An illustration of the discriminatory pricing auction relative to the first rejected price auction. Under the latter, forest 
owners will bid their true cost (full line curve) and those selected under the budget will receive a price corresponding to the 
horizontal dashed line. In a discriminatory price auction, forest owners will overstate cost in their offer, because they are paid 
their offer. Thus their offers could be the dashed curve. The effect is to reduce information rents by the area A between the 
horizontal line and the bid curve. This can be used to buy the additional area indicated by A*. 
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of the key challenges for most reverse auction applications in the field of ecosystem services, and 
we draw forward those most relevant for the current setting in the sections below along with 
additional challenges. It is noteworthy that in most of these later works, a basic premise remains 
that to obtain information about the true cost to producers and hence at least partially truthful offers, 
procurement auction designs must account for asymmetric information regarding costs, and this 
typically involves some form of rent for the low-cost agents. 
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3. Procurement mechanisms in environmental schemes 
for agricultural and forest land 
3.1 Insights from full-scale cases and field experiments 
Connor et al. (2008) analyse the Australian Catchment Care program, which applies a sealed bid1 
discriminant price auction for procurement of conservation efforts. Landowners submit offers along 
with conservation actions they propose, chosen from a closed set of options. Landowners are given 
information as to what parameters will be considered when assessing the environmental value of 
their proposal, but are not informed about the actual and rather complex assessment of this. As 
Connor et al. (2008) points out, keeping this information private to the agency could reduce 
successful rent seeking. They also show that the auction is equally good to negotiated 
discriminatory contracts entered with full information and somewhat better than uniformly priced 
negotiated contracts. This may suggest that not many private amenity values are present on the 
landowners side and that the cost structure can be assessed fairly well, which contrasts to Danish 
and Finnish findings (Juutinen and Ollikainen 2010; Vedel et al. 2015a). Otherwise this case has 
interesting similarities to the Danish untouched forest case. 
 
Binney and Whiteoak (2010) present a review of the Tasmanian Forest Conservation Fund, which 
also implemented conservation measures using a competitive tender, reverse auction with 
discriminative offers (here discriminative means that each seller will be paid the price they offered, 
if accepted), information on conservation index, and in this case with several rounds. They observed 
a significant cost efficiency of the competitive approach though efficiency was reduced over 
rounds, possibly as the most cost effective sites were contracted in earlier rounds, but agent learning 
may also have played a role. 
 
Jacobsen (2004) reports on the performance and result of a Danish experiment buying back nitrogen 
quotas from landowners using a reverse auction framework. The auction used a discriminatory 
pricing setup. Offers were received from both forestry properties (where quotas were likely in 
surplus from former Christmas tree plantations) and from various farm types. There was a huge 
                                                 
 
1 Consistent with our terminology, it is a sealed offer, but the literature refers to it as ‘bid’, so this term will be used. 
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variation in offers from 7 DKK/kg N to 85 DKK/kg N. Nevertheless, authorities decided to pay all 
offers the requested price, resulting in a lower than possible efficiency and some agents capturing 
substantial rents. 
 
3.1.2 Field experiments with first rejected price reverse auctions 
Jack et al. (2009) applied a single round, sealed bid, first rejected price auction of payment contracts 
to elicit cost information for a conservation payment program targeting soil erosion on coffee farms 
in Indonesia. Soil erosion generates downstream ecological and economic costs in these areas. 
Notably, the first rejected price auction design was chosen in this case due to poverty alleviation 
considerations, that is, information rent transfers served a second objective as an income equity 
measure. The potential distortions from this kind of secondary objectives in such schemes have 
been discussed by Delacote et al. (2014). 
 
Pant (2015) presents the result of what is essentially a first rejected price auction among Nepalese 
farmers aimed at reducing the practice of burning rice straw post-harvest. The study engaged with 
317 farmers across 18 villages each placing individual offers and all contracted farmers received the 
same uniform unit price. Jindal et al. (2013) report the results of a pilot Payment for Ecosystem 
Services scheme in Tanzania’s Uluguru Mountains, applying a first rejected price reverse auction. 
They present an analysis of the performance to inform later larger scale roll-outs. 
 
3.1.3 Field experiment with discriminative payment 
There is laboratory evidence that discriminative payments can be superior to uniform price auctions 
under suitable conditions (Cason and Gangadharan 2005), and several field experiments have 
pursued these.  
 
Eigenraam et al. (2005) present the result of a pilot of a program called the EcoTender, targeting the 
enhanced supply of a number of different ecosystem services. The pilot was designed as a first 
price, discriminatory sealed offer auction with a single round. The participating landowners were 
informed about the aggregate environmental scores of their land, as well as the parts of that score, 
along with the overall distribution of scores from all the potential offers. The fact that it was 
potential offers, which is likely a much larger pool than actual offers, in combination with the 
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‘single round’ feature, may explain why this information had little effect on the offers given and 
hence information rents. 
 
Juutinen and Ollikainen (2010) analyse the Finish Trade in Nature Value (TNV) program, the first, 
and still one of fairly few, full-scale experiments with reverse auctions in European forest policy. 
They use data from actual TNV contracts from the years 2003 and 2004 to simulate and analyse the 
outcome of a discriminatory first-price auction design, in which the government makes a separate 
contract with each landowner. They show that under certain conditions about ecological ranking, 
the buyers’ benefit function and the information available to those making offers, information rent 
can be substantial. In their simulations, these rents depend massively on the value assigned to the 
biodiversity score and its weight relative to the offer, and rents make up most of the payment and 
vastly exceed actual estimated opportunity costs. This is because the actual individual offer is the 
anchor for the negotiation and the forest owners can assess post-offer if their biodiversity/offer ratio 
is competitive. Juutinen and Ollikainen (2010) correctly point out that it is crucial to decide how 
precise the measure defining biodiversity quality should enter the compensation schedule. The more 
exact the measures are defined, the higher average biodiversity values, but the cost being significant 
losses in terms of hectares covered and potentially therefore much lower aggregate biodiversity 
conservation impact. 
 
Khalumba et al. (2014) report the results of a mixed method experiment in Western Kenya. They 
combined procurement auctions for forest enrichment contracts with (outcome) performance-based 
payments among participatory forestry communities. They compared the outcomes with a baseline 
scenario currently used by the Kenyan Forest Service. They found that the procurement auctions 
were the most cost-effective, and further that the outcome based measures post-contract provided 
additional incentives to care for the planted seedlings and hence better outcomes. They further 
compared the gains to transactions cost (e.g. the costs related to preparation and submission of an 
offer), which is rarely done, and found that gains clearly exceeded the transactions costs. The field 
experiment did, however, target a fairly small number of communities and participants. 
 
Narloch et al. (2017) analysed two pilot schemes for payment for ecosystem services that were 
implemented as procurement auctions (conservation tenders) asking farmers to coordinate and offer 
as groups in a discriminatory price one-off auctions to win a tender. Winners were identified based 
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on a cost-benefit assessment undisclosed to those making offers. Payments where both cash and 
collective premiums like machinery. The study found that such auctions could effectively induce 
coordination among agents, thus placing part of that cost among agents rather than at the agency. 
 
3.2 Insights from Stated Preference and lab experiments 
There is an abundant literature assessing the willingness of landowners (farmers or forest owners) to 
enter contracts specifying costly management actions on their land targeting some form of 
environmental improvement. What we focus on in this section is how the different experiments set 
up the participation and payment mechanisms for the landowners, and what can be said regarding to 
what extent the designs encourage truthful opportunity cost reflections. 
 
3.2.1 Menu of contract applications 
A significant number of the studies apply setups that resemble a so-called menu of contracts. A 
menu of contracts is a set of different contract alternatives each with an attached payment related to 
it. Good examples of such are the Danish schemes for afforestation and for biodiversity measures, 
where landowners might opt for different contract versions implying different levels of restrictions 
and demands on their actions, and each resulting in different, often pre-specified, compensation 
payments. Thus, in these cases forest owners are often left to assume that if they qualify for a 
scheme, they can also expect to land a contract, though budget restrictions may of course affect that 
in practice. More importantly, landowners do not have to specify offers as the payments are 
predetermined. The landowners only have to decide if and which scheme they will opt for. Under 
such circumstances, the menu of contracts needs to be designed to account for asymmetric 
information to ensure that each landowner picks the contract scheme most suited to his or her cost 
and production setup (Anthon et al. 2007). 
 
Examples of stated preference studies that can be perceived as menu of contract studies are; 
- Vaissière et al. (2017) on willingness to accept biodiversity offset contracts with 
compensation paid from a fund based on payments from land developers. They applied a 
choice experiment setting with variable contract compositions. 
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- Broch and Vedel (2012) analysed the willingness to enter afforestation contracts in a choice 
experiment setting. Danish landowners were asked to pick between various contracts, with 
varying design features, and each with variable contract specific compensation payments. 
Though not an auction, the results demonstrated significant variation in stated willingness to 
accept, and hence likely opportunity costs of landowners. They also demonstrated aggregate 
compensation claims not too far from actual payments in existing schemes. 
 
 
- A contingent valuation study on agri-environmental schemes contracts by Dupraz et al. 
(2003) also found that stated willingness to accept was quite close to comparable actual 
payments from existing schemes suggesting that hypothetic bias is modest when the setup 
and cost levels are well known. 
 
- Vedel et al. (2015a) present the results of a choice experiment asking Danish forest owners 
to pick several alternatives among several sets of contracts rewarding them (with lower 
property taxes) for setting aside forest as untouched, increasing recreational access options 
and preserving single trees for natural death and decay. The results again show stated 
willingness to accept measures that are easily within reasonable capital cost measures as e.g. 
found in Jacobsen et al. (2013). Furthermore, Vedel et al. (2015a) showed that forest 
owners, who stated they already allowed access for the public or had set aside forest as 
untouched, also had a considerable lower compensation claim. See Figure 3.1 based on that 
paper, which shows the large variation in Danish forest owners stated compensation claims 
for setting aside 5 per cent of their current forest property as untouched. A relatively large 
fraction of owners has expressed low compensation claims. Data is extrapolated to national 
scale; however, it is based on observations from forest owners who own 12.5 per cent of the 
total private forest area. 
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Figure 3.1 The simulated supply for various levels of compensation offers for setting aside untouched 
forest in Denmark. Based on Vedel et al. (2015a). 
 
A different variant of procurement mechanisms was investigated by Bush et al. (2013) who applied 
contingent valuation in asking households for willingness to accept compensation contracts for 
reduced access to national park areas. They framed this as a provision point mechanism scheme, 
where a certain minimum of total contracts was required for any households to obtain a contract. 
This effectively reduced compensation claims, even if no actual coordination was called for. While 
this is not a competition situation, it is a case where inflating your claim increases the overall risk of 
no one getting a contract. This could be a relevant point to consider in cases where auctions or other 
instruments are designed to e.g. encourage forest owners to cooperate to put up offers either in a 
competition with other teams, or setting them up to offer individually without collaboration and 
information exchange, but against a similar mechanism. 
 
3.2.2 Reverse auctions in stated preference surveys and lab experiments  
Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann (2007) undertake a lab experiment evaluation of various 
conservation auction designs, and with specific focus on the difference between single and multi-
round discriminatory price auctions. They also implement a treatment regarding the framing of the 
auction, where in one auction, participants were told there was a limited budget to compete for, in 
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the second treatment, they were told there was a specific target to be contracted. The two auctions 
appeared similar in efficiency in one-shot setting, but the budget framing appears more robust in 
results over repeated rounds. 
 
Reeson et al. (2011) undertake a lab experiment focused on testing the options for enhanced 
coordination at landscape levels in multiple round procurement auctions. They evaluate designs 
where the number of rounds are either known or unknown and where a lock-in is either required or 
not. They find that when the number of bidding rounds is unknown a priori to agents, the cost 
effectiveness is improved. There is also an effect of requiring lock-in, which is implemented as a 
rule prohibiting raising prices across rounds. They do not evaluate against the single round 
alternative. 
 
Iftekhar and Tisdell (2014) belong to a larger group of lab experiment studies concerned with how 
to encourage coordination among landowners when environmental services are best delivered over 
larger tracts of land across landowners (e.g. Parkhurst et al. 2002; Wätzold and Drechsler 2005). 
However, rather than the bonus grant scheme typically set up for that literature, they let groups of 
landowners offer against each other in a series of repeated open bidding auctions with 
communication. The sequential structure implies learning, which similar to standard non-
coordinated auctions increases rents in particular as the landowners were able to assess the relative 
value of their project. It also increases coordination, however, and hence the environmental value of 
the projects proposed, and cost-efficiency as such increases over at least the initial part of the 
bidding sequences. This is contrary to non-coordinated auctions. 
 
Bakkegaard et al. (2017) implemented a contingent valuation type procurement auction instrument 
among small holders in Amazon. The instrument targeted reduced logging of primary rain forest on 
land held by rural households. The auction instrument was designed as a first rejected price auction 
(a reverse second price auction). This proved to be substantially more cost-effective than a simple 
discriminatory price procurement format, simply asking for the required compensation but without 
the competitive aspect of an auction. 
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4. Key assumptions and common challenges contrasted 
with the case of procurement of untouched forest 
In this section, we list and discuss a number of the key assumptions underlying the theory and 
practice of using reverse auction type instruments in e.g. environmental regulation systems. We 
outline the basic features of the way various forms of reverse auctions function, ideally, and use this 
to describe key concepts and potential benefits. Based on this, we address a number of challenges 
for implementation in practice as revealed by the literature on existing schemes as well as field and 
lab experiments. In all sub-parts, we discuss how each issue may be viewed and thought of, as well 
as inform about the potential design and implementation of the reverse auction type instrument for 
the procurement of forest land for biodiversity protection in Denmark. 
 
4.1 Some key assumptions 
The key assumptions concern three elements; the selling agents, the good asked for, and the 
principal asking for and buying the good. 
 
4.1.1. The selling agents 
Forest owners, as rational agents, are assumed to know their net private costs of setting aside a 
specific part of their forest as untouched. Note that the net includes taking into account possible 
private benefits they may expect to gain from this action, e.g. amenity values, and including 
possible spillovers to other parts of their property or activities (Juutinen et al. 2013; Vedel et al. 
2015a). These assumptions are in all likelihood well satisfied for forest owners, in general. It is not 
generally necessary for the selling agent to know all aspects of the quality of the environmental 
good they are delivering; just the quality aspects that the good is requested to possess to be eligible 
for the market or that can be described and varied along with price in their actual offer. In the 
current context, forest owners e.g. may know they possess an eligible forest area – and if the design 
allows or asks for it – offer it at a specific price and quality in terms of volume left or treatment of 
ditches and drains. 
 
Finally, it should be stressed that agents, and hence forest owners, are also assumed to be price-
takers on relevant markets, including the artificial market created in the reverse auction. This 
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implies that they are unable to coordinate and collude with other agents to affect the resulting prices 
(across agents) of the goods to be delivered in the reverse auction in any meaningful way. This 
assumption cannot be seen separately from the design of the auction and notably the delineation of 
the market and the resulting potential number of suppliers. Below, we discuss this aspect in relation 
to the case of paying forest owners for setting aside forest land for untouched forest. It relates to 
issues like geographical or other quality targeting, which may reduce the number of competitive 
suppliers in ways that hand them instruments to identify likely competitors and collude. 
 
4.1.2 The goods asked for 
Some assumptions about the good typically also need to be fulfilled for an instrument to perform 
well, but which assumptions depend to some extent on the design of the instrument. For first 
rejected price auctions, where all participants are paid the same amount for the good delivered, a 
homogenous good is preferable. Below, we discuss this aspect in relation to e.g. segmenting of 
markets according to tree species. For discriminatory pricing schemes, where the payment to each 
participant is (a function of) their own offer, homogeneity requirements can be more lax within the 
same competing pool, provided quality variation is taken into account in selecting offers and setting 
payments (Latacz-Lohman and Haamsvoort 1997). 
 
4.1.3 The principal  
The principal paying for, buying, and holding the contracts for the environmental good is usually 
also assumed to fulfil some assumptions. First and foremost, the principal is assumed to know their 
objective function and hence be able to formulate a clear preference function across relevant 
dimensions. This will allow them to select the optimal set of offers from the offers received, taking 
into account relevant quality attributes and costs as determined by the auction pricing mechanism. 
The principal is also often assumed to have a finite budget or a finite environmental measure target, 
which works to enhance competition, just like the principal may also set some maximum prices. 
Because benefits are rarely measured in welfare economic terms, none of the studies in the literature 
or schemes implemented in field experiments or full scale have targeted welfare maximization in 
the design and contracting targets. In a few cases, this latter feature has resulted in outcomes, which 
seem in contrast with welfare maximization, e.g. the former Danish experiment with a reverse 
auction for N-quotas among landowners (Jacobsen 2004). In the literature, one issue discussed 
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based on both full-scale schemes and various experiments, is to what extent the overall performance 
may benefit from the principal trying to be explicit a priori about their preferences, typically using 
some form of weighting scheme across several criteria and supplying this information embedded in 
the auction procedure. 
 
4.2 Some common challenges 
In this section, we briefly address some of the common challenges identified in the literature that 
we find relevant to consider also for the case of an untouched forest instrument. 
 
4.2.1 Market size and cost heterogeneity 
As stressed several times in the literature, e.g. Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi (2005), the use of 
reverse auction type instruments should only be considered in cases where a number of suppliers 
are likely to participate, and where this number is sufficiently high to ensure competition. This has 
implications for design, because e.g. targeting or segmentation may reduce the pool of potential 
suppliers and thereby may reduce competition. At the same time, the less information available 
about cost heterogeneity among suppliers, the larger the overall potential from the auction 
instrument. In the case of untouched forest, model based estimates of opportunity costs combined 
with site visits underpinning the current scheme do provide some information about costs across 
suppliers. However, there is no way to infer other elements, including possible private benefit, 
which could be substantial for some owners (Vedel et al. 2015a). 
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In the Danish untouched forest case, these generic challenges have relevance for the potential 
segmentation of the market into different auctions. The production model based estimates of forest 
owners’ opportunity costs reveal that a substantial part of the overall variation in costs relate to tree 
species, standing volume, and site quality. In Figure 4.1 this is loosely sketched. These differences 
suggest that segmentation and weighting should be considered for two reasons: First of all, if all 
these forest types are handled in one auction, with no weighting, then most of the forest land 
contracted will likely be low-cost alder or ash type forest and/or on poor soil conditions. This may 
be counter to preferences of society. Second, whether handled in a discriminatory or first-rejected 
price auction, the cost variation is likely to result in rather high information rents for forest owners 
offering low-cost forest types. Separating the forest types into different auctions, with each type 
competing only with itself, will eliminate these problems. It will of course imply fewer suppliers in 
each auction, but if no other restrictions or targeting is implemented, this segmentation in itself 
should not reduce competition unduly. We discuss issues related to further targeting below. 
 
4.2.2 One-off auctions, repeated auctions, post-offer negotiations and learning 
There are several discussions in the literature building on experiences from full-scale schemes and 
experiments related to the role of auction frequency and post-auction negotiations for efficiency. 
We draw forward some of relevance for the Danish untouched forest case. 
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Figure 4.1 An illustration of how forest owners perceived costs of setting aside forest as untouched (curved line) 
may relate to what type of forest they have. 
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It is well-documented that in repeated reverse auctions, where the landowners frequently enter in 
new offers for contract renewal on the same land or for new contracts on additional land, offer 
patterns over time tend to increase for low-cost agents as they learn about the buyer’s preferences 
and willingness to pay for the environmental goods they offer (Rolfe et al. 2009; Latacz-Lohmann 
and Schilizzi 2005). This increases information rents and reduces efficiency of the instrument. This 
observation is an argument for making such reverse auctions one-off and for making contracts 
permanent or at least long-term, which would fit the Danish untouched forest case well. 
 
In some schemes, e.g. the Finnish case (see e.g. Juutinen et al. 2013), it has been practice to follow-
up the offer from the landowner with e.g. a site visit and subsequent negotiations on the price, and 
perhaps additional measures. The costs and benefits of this can be hard to predict. If the suppliers 
think they have a good chance of being selected and may come under pressure to reduce prices, they 
have an incentive to increase the initial offer. If the initial offer is not binding, due to subsequent 
negotiation, they may also decrease their offer to increase the chance of being selected for 
negotiations, then increase offers during negotiations and walk away if not enough rents are made. 
Neither of these behaviours is beneficial for efficiency, but they do imply additional transaction 
costs for both parties. The potential benefit for the buyer side, therefore, is the option to ask for 
project modification that increases the environmental quality of the good delivered at suitably low 
costs – or decrease the offer asked at no or suitably low reductions in environmental quality. In the 
Danish case, where setting aside the forest is a main and straightforward measure, it may be this 
latter option that has value, e.g. if removing part of the wood value can be done at little or no harm 
to environmental goals but used to reduce the offer. 
 
Despite the one-off and permanent type of contracts expected under the Danish untouched forest 
scheme, the fact that the scheme is expected to be repeated over the coming years may imply some 
learning and effects on future offers. This may happen for landowners who submit new offers over 
several years or happen across landowners as new landowners decide to enter offers in later rounds. 
This is likely to put efficiency under pressure as the option to wait and postpone the offering has 
value, if learning can happen. This holds even without strategic motives, if dynamic cost 
uncertainty exists. As pointed out by Thorsen (1999), one-off offers are likely to be cheaper under 
such uncertainty. 
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Finally, the scheme that ran in 2017 may have some impact on the performance of the coming 
reverse auction outcomes. First, as evident from Figure 4.1 above, forest owners who have a larger 
private benefit from setting aside forest as untouched are likely to find the current scheme attractive. 
Provided their private benefits are large and their production value opportunity costs are too, the 
current scheme could be more attractive than the auction. If they have low production value based 
opportunity costs, they may have seen larger benefits in waiting for the reverse auction to be 
implemented. 
 
4.2.3 Announcing budgets and pricing mechanisms 
To provide an incentive for suppliers to place offers, a reverse auction framing has to explicitly 
describe how offers are converted to pricing of contract. Latacz-Lohmann and Haamsvoort (1997) 
point out that apart from such a price setting rule or algorithm, either a budget constraint and/or a 
reserve price that is a maximum acceptable price, should in general be published to ensure 
participants perceive they compete for a limited amount of funding. They also cite evidence that a 
reserve price is less effective whereas e.g. truthful budget constraint information is useful. This is 
likely due to reserve prices essentially working as a targeting anchor for participants. It may also be 
useful to state, if possible, that the buyer is under no obligation to spend the budget on received 
proposals if they are found to be of insufficient relevance or too expensive. One may also consider 
estimates of the full potential market volume to be worthwhile information to publish along with the 
auction procedures, to inform potential participants about the competition level. 
 
In the Danish case, the existence of a budget constraint for the 2018 round of the auction forms a 
natural basis for a message about the limited budget. If accompanied by a message about absence of 
buying obligations and perhaps an undisclosed price limit, these should be effective in framing the 
auction as a true competition. 
 
It can also be important for ex post efficiency that the buyer has decided upon a budget constraint 
and/or maximum price ceilings. Without it, information rents paid over the entire auction can be 
prohibitively expensive, as was the case in the earlier case of N-quota reverse auctions evaluated by 
Jacobsen (2004). 
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4.2.4 Factoring in environmental quality variation and spatial aspects 
Reverse auctions for conservation and other types of environmental contracts are often a complex 
type of multi-attribute procurement. Society, and hence the buyer, may consider a number of 
attributes of an area and/or a land management action important for the quality and value of the 
environmental outcome. In principal, all environmental goods offered for contracting may differ 
from each other on any number of quality parameters. 
 
The effect is that the buyer may worry about how to obtain the best aggregate environmental 
outcome for the budget across any number of attributes. For this reason, several examples can be 
found of schemes and experiments testing the use of indices or rankings or other ways of ranking 
the offered contracts prior to selecting which offers to accept (see the above review, and also e.g. 
Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi (2005)). Such approaches may e.g. condense environmental 
attributes into a single score, e.g. using some linear weighting scheme, representing the overall 
environmental performance of the supplied lands. Offers are then selected for the conservation 
programs on the basis of their “score/cost” ratio under the given budget constraint. 
 
While these aspects are undoubtedly important for efficiency, they also raise challenges. Some 
qualities, e.g. spatial aspects like proximity to other protected areas or other areas offered in the 
auction are hard if not impossible to handle meaningfully using simple linear weights, often 
specified a priori. Furthermore, acquiring the necessary information may be costly and its 
application uncertain or subject to challenges ex post. 
 
In some existing experiments and schemes, some of the information used in the ranking procedure 
has been made available for the suppliers prior to making their offer. This is also not without 
difficulty and may have several effects. On the positive side, it increases the potential transparency 
and may work to draw forward more land of relevance. On the other hand, it raises the transaction 
costs of participation, which may reduce participation overall. Furthermore, landowners with 
environmentally attractive land may realize this and use the information as a basis for extracting 
higher rents and increase their offer – in turn reducing efficiency. 
 
For these reasons, it is a matter of scientific and practical debate what and how much prior 
information to give potential suppliers about the different aspects of environmental quality and how 
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they are taken into account in the selection of offers. Examples exist where this is described in 
broader terms and e.g. landowners are only informed about the score of land in their region and the 
overall distributions of scores across all relevant land areas. Such aggregate information is both 
fairly precise and yet also formulated in a way to discourage strategic behaviour, but it can be costly 
to produce and may be contested on technical grounds. 
 
The handling of spatial co-dependence of environmental values of land offered is particular difficult 
to handle. Proximity to existing protected land may be an asset, which can be assessed ex post as 
well as by the supplier before providing an offer. However, it may also be of value if new land areas 
offered for conservation are spatially linked or close to each other. This requires either ex ante 
coordination among landowners or some ex post selection criteria, which by definition cannot be 
assessed before. Ex ante coordination may be handled by letting landowners submit coordinate 
offers for e.g. contiguous areas, along with independent offers for those same areas. That will allow 
the buyer to select the land from all landowners, paying a potential premium for them to offer 
contagious areas, or only some of the land in non-contiguous configurations. This of course 
increases transactions costs and may also limit competition and encourage unwanted coordination 
of the individual offers. 
 
More generally, in multi-attribute procurement cases like the Danish untouched forest scheme, it is 
difficult and costly to formulate even reasonably accurate objective functions for the buyer in 
mathematically tractable ways that allow simple constructs like indices and scores to carry sound 
meaning when used ex post to prioritize and select what offers to accept. In fact, because the scores 
are often simplified linear constructs based on incomplete ex ante knowledge, they can result in 
rankings and decisions that ex post are obviously wrong and potentially costly (Hougaard et al. 
2016). Research in efficient multi-attribute procurement has addressed the potential for applying 
pricing methods that can resolve procurement auctions with as little a priori information collection 
as possible, yet still handle the fact that cost information is private to suppliers adequately. 
Specifically, the use of data envelopment analysis for yard stick pricing (see below) in procurement 
auctions is being studied (Bogetoft and Nielsen 2008), and current research efforts are addressing 
the potential for applying this to public procurements schemes much like the Danish untouched 
forest scheme (Hougaard et al. 2016; Nielsen et al. 2017b). The ambition is to have if not first-best 
optimal outcomes then at least very good approximations that can be obtained without costly 
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information collection efforts of both suppliers and the buyer, while still retaining truth-telling as a 
useful strategy for the suppliers and applying pricing rules that leaves suppliers no worse off than 
their stated offers ex post. The approach implies that suppliers provide their offers (combinations of 
prices and some information about the qualities of the offer). Offers are then described in terms of 
these as well as potentially additional attributes, where information is readily available, for example 
various biodiversity measures as will be described below in Chapter 5. A yardstick-based algorithm 
then calculates a set of efficiency corrected yardstick offers, one for each offer, where each offer is 
measured up against a yardstick defined by the most efficient span of all closely related offers. The 
buyer then ex post selects the combination of offers that the buyer finds are optimal, given the 
yardstick prices. In this way, the buyer need not formulate preference a priori in condensed form, 
but can satisfy preferences overall across the entire set of offers ex post. The selected suppliers are 
offered the maximum of their stated offer and the calculated, efficiency corrected yardstick price, 
and this feature implies that truth-telling remains a dominant strategy for them when formulating 
offers. 
 
4.2.5 Intermediaries and other agents 
Landowners, whether farmers or forest owners, may often rely on intermediaries, e.g. extension 
service agents, consultants or professional management companies, for much of the administrative 
work, for decision support, for obtaining information about rules, regulations and market 
information and many other aspects. The presence and behaviour of such agents may influence the 
performance of reverse auctions in different ways. 
 
A potential positive effect of these agents is that they provide an information effect and enhance 
transparency. Aggregating across landowners, they are able to harvest economies of scale, enabling 
them to cover costs of information search and analysis, e.g. about new instruments and their 
potentials, and disseminate these in a targeted and adapted manner to the different landowners. 
Fulfilling this role, such agents work to enhance information uptake, possibly increasing 
participation rates and hence market size and competition in the reverse auctions. This works to 
enhance efficiency of the instruments. 
 
A potential negative effect of these agents may arise if they not only inform the forest owners, but 
also support their cost assessments and perhaps submit offers. This could result in unwanted and 
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untruthful homogenization of offers across landowners, and it could be conducive to collusion and 
coordination of offers. This may happen even in the absence of strategic behaviour, but simply as 
the result of agents decreasing own costs of entering offers or being concerned about issues of 
perceived fairness across customers, both concerns may be a reason for submitting too similar 
offers that do not reflect actual variation in opportunity costs. 
 
Both of these aspects need to be considered in the case of untouched forest in Denmark. The Danish 
forest sector has numerous agents that can be activated in various ways to enhance information up-
take and hence market size. At the same time, procedures to counter offer homogenization and 
coordination through these agents might need to be developed. 
 
4.2.6 Issues post-contracting 
In many contracting cases, there is a need to describe and implement a structure able to handle 
moral hazards. Moral hazards arise when the supplier has an incentive to shirk or somehow violate 
the terms of the contract. This can be hard and costly for the buyer to monitor and to detect, and 
when detected, it may be impossible to re-establish the environmental good contracted, effectively 
implying a loss for the buyer. To discourage such behaviour on the supplier side, contracts need to 
include a description of the consequences for the supplier, typically involving actions like 
confiscation of any gains, repayment of original payments, possibly including accumulated interest 
and perhaps a fine in addition. The buyer may also describe rules for the frequency of control visits, 
documentation requirements or other features that introduce control and monitoring. While such 
contract aspects are generally necessary, they may of course also come at a cost in terms of higher 
offers being asked for due to the negative effect monitoring has on landowners utility (Vedel et al. 
2015b). 
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5. Biodiversity and environmental targeting 
5.1 Auctions, goals and targets 
Many of the previously highlighted auctioning mechanisms in Australia (Stoneham et al. 2003; 
Connor et al. 2008; Kits et al. 2014), Canada (Brown et al. 2011) and elsewhere have applied 
information on so-called biodiversity or environmental benefits for increasing the cost-effectiveness 
of the programs by targeting landowners where benefits per cost were highest. 
 
The targeting may be towards one goal (e.g. biodiversity or soil erosion). Targeting could also be 
towards multiple goals (e.g. biodiversity, water, carbon capture). Including more goals may 
complicate the calculation of effect of the conservation program. Effect assessment is usually based 
on current conditions. However, the modelling of expected effect is based on the current state and 
response to actions. Further, the baseline (or counterfactual) should ideally be included by 
incorporating risk and uncertainty into the calculation of expected effect. Estimating outputs and 
outcomes requires some predictive function to be generated based on the existing condition and the 
inputs (management actions) to be added. This is illustrated in Figure 5.1 showing that the potential 
aggregated biodiversity gains depend on the predicted loss (baseline), and how conservation action 
may contribute by maintaining status quo (maintenance) and lead to potential improvements. The 
figure shows the ideal effect assessment, however, in most cases such information is not available 
and only current status on biodiversity and environmental benefits are available. Therefore most 
approaches focus on immediate inputs (e.g. area set aside) instead of outcomes generated by the 
conservation action. 
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Figure 5.1. Concept of effect assessment over time. (mod. after O’connor 2015). 
 
 
A large number of metrics have been developed. One common metric is to base the prioritisation of 
offers on the ratio between a biodiversity/environmental benefit index, and the offer. In its simplest 
version, offers with the highest ratios are selected. The use of metrics to better target the schemes 
may increase the cost-effectiveness considerably. Wunscher et al. (2006) simulated different 
targeting approaches for the Costa Rican payments for environmental services scheme and found 
that the use of a biodiversity benefit metric, compared to current practice ignoring such information, 
resulted in an increase of 14 per cent in benefits. The use of metrics is also discussed above in 
section 4.2.4. The mathematic formulations of the metrics vary from considering single goals to 
multiple goals, and additive weighted sum scoring to multiplicative weighted scoring systems. 
Table 5.1 describes some examples of auctioning schemes where the number of goals vary from 
single to multiple and the number of indicators from a few to many. The complexity increases with 
goals and targets. 
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Table 5.1. Examples of auctioning programs, the number of goals they target, and data 
Examples Problem/context Targeting data No. of indicators 
The Victorian 
BushTender 
Program, 
Biodiversity 
Benefits Index 
One goal Biodiversity 
Price, Management effect 
12 
Conservation 
Reserve 
Program, 
Environmental 
Benefits Index-
USA 
Multiple goals Biodiversity, erosion, water quality 
(sediments, nutrients, pesticides) 
Price 
7 
The Western 
Australian 
Auction for 
Landscape 
Recovery 
Multiple goals Biodiversity, erosion, water quality 
(sediments, nutrients), agricultural production 
Price, management effect 
48 
Forest 
Biodiversity 
Programme 
METSO – 
Finland 
One goal Biodiversity 
Price 
2 (10+8 sub-
indicators) 
Tasmanian 
Forest 
Conservation 
One goal Forest Priority Score(2), Structural 
Condition, Current condition value, Regional 
Threat Index, Reserve value, 
Price, Management effect 
(maintenance+improvement+security) 
10 
 
 
5.2. Biodiversity data 
Biodiversity can be described from the differences in genes, species and ecosystems. Ecosystems 
can be considered at many levels, from the global and down to a geographically defined area in 
nature, where plants and animals interact with each other and their physical environment. Despite 
the scientific evidence that the genetic variation and diversity of ecosystems are important 
components of biodiversity, diversity of species is the most widely used target for biodiversity. This 
is because, traditionally, there is high awareness of the species, and of the fact that the diversity of 
species is simpler than the other two categories. At the same time, there is a greater knowledge of 
species diversity and a positive link between the diversity of species and the diversity of genes and 
ecosystems (Vié et al. 2009). For these reasons, diversity of species is often used as an overall 
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indicator of biodiversity. However, the number of species at a specific site is not the only parameter 
relevant to land management in relation to biodiversity conservation. For example, it is of great 
importance, whether the species is a common or a threatened species. In addition, it is also relevant 
to include the possibility of species to survive in the long term, and here parameters about the 
geographical size of species habitats and correlation with the existing nature can be important. 
 
In recent years, more biodiversity data has become available for large scale prioritization analysis 
(Petersen et al. 2012, 2016). They present distributional data for various species groups in Denmark 
compiled for a 10×10 km UTM grid cells covering all of Denmark. The data records the presence or 
absence of each of the species in each of the grid cells. The data set in Petersen et al. (2012) covers 
a total of 899 terrestrial and a few semi-aquatic species breeding in Denmark.2 Earlier versions and 
subsets of this data set have been  used for quantitative biodiversity analyses (Lund & Rahbek 2002; 
Strange et al. 2006; Larsen et al. 2008, 2009, 2012; Bladt et al. 2009). The data represents the most 
complete species distribution data in Denmark. However, currently the University of Copenhagen 
(Centre for Macroecology, Evolution and Climate) is developing a data set for the Danish State 
forests, which in principle allows assessing biodiversity at a much higher spatial resolution. The 
data combines available spatial presence/absence data and data from the national biodiversity map, 
which consists in a spatial prioritization of nature areas according to their significance for 
Denmark's biodiversity (Ejrnæs et al. 2014). The biodiversity map in Ejrnæs et al. (2014) contains a 
national priority in the form of an analytical designation of the most important 10×10 km squares 
and a local 10×10 m priority in the form of a species score indicating the importance of the area as 
habitat for red-listed species. Priority on a national scale is made on the basis of data for the 
national distribution of 537 endangered species in 633 squares at 10×10 km. 
                                                 
 
2 These are 5 reptile species, 13 amphibians, 181 birds, 48 mammals, 41 dragonflies (Odonata), 23 grasshoppers 
(Orthoptera), 60 true bugs (Heteroptera: Pentatomidea, Coreoidea, Pyrrhocoridea), 21 click beetles (Coleoptera: 
Elateridae), 248 hoverflies (Diptera: Syrphidae), 58 butterflies (Lepidoptera: Hesperioidea, Papilionoidea), 154 large 
moths (Lepidoptera: Hepialoidea, Cossoidea, Zygaenoidea, Tineoidea, Yponomentoidea, Bombycoidea, Geometroidea, 
Sphingoidea, Notodontoidea, Noctuoidea), 6 club mosses (Lycopodiaceae) and 35 orchids. The data include the 
majority of the Danish species within each group except for the click beetles, which mainly include species associated 
with old forest. We excluded vagrant, casual and exotic species from the data set to avoid bias towards those species. 
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6. Considerations of the pros and cons of alternative 
designs in a Danish forest context 
Chapter 4 outlined some of the key considerations in the choice of the design of a reverse auction of 
harvesting rights to forestland and section 5 outlined some of the key quality parameters. In this 
section, we aim to use existing data of the spatial distribution of forest owners, biodiversity 
indicators and the capital value of mature forests to get a sense of the critical assumptions 
determining the relative merits of alternative designs. We choose to illustrate four possible designs 
to highlight, when each of the designs is likely to be cost-effective. It must be stressed that the 
analysis rests on assumptions of key factors. Empirical data are not available to give any indication 
as to how plausible the assumptions might be. Nevertheless, the analysis gives some guidance how 
to reduce the risk that the cost of the reverse auction becomes excessive. 
 
6.1 Alternative designs 
All four designs are based on the assumption that each forest owner, who is interested in entering 
the form of contract, will submit an offer for five hectares. This is done for simplicity and should 
not have any qualitative effects. It is also assumed that each forest owner can submit one offer. 
 
Design A: The reverse auction is purely based on price/ha. There is no distinction between areas 
based on quality, and the successful participants are paid based on their submitted offer. 
Design B: The reverse auction is purely based on price/ha. There is no distinction between areas 
based on quality, and the participants are paid based on first rejected price principle. 
Design C: The reverse auction is based on price per biodiversity point. The point system is based on 
a weighted sum of points for price and points for biodiversity. The points allocated to the price are 
scaled relative to the cheapest offer, where the cheapest offer gives 5 points. The points allocated to 
biodiversity are based on the bioscores for the area (Ejrnæs et al. 2014). The points allocated to the 
offer are relative to the highest bioscore, and the highest score gives 5 points. In the example 
illustrated below, price and biodiversity are weighted with 50 per cent each. 
Design D: The reverse auction is purely based on price/ha. Two types of forests are eligible areas, 
one dominated by alder, the other type dominated by beech and oak. There is no discrimination 
between areas based on quality, and the participants are paid based on their submitted offer. It is 
assumed that it is equally likely that the forest owner submits an offer for each of the types. 
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For all designs, it is assumed that 1 per cent of the forest owners will be interested in submitting an 
offer, and we simulate a single auction. Therefore, we have not at this stage taken any potential 
learning effects into account. It is likely that the interest in the auction will vary across the four 
designs, but there is no data to give an estimate on the relationship and therefore, we have not 
included this aspect in the analysis. 
 
6.2 Data 
The data for the analysis originates from aggregated owner and property data analysed in Nielsen et 
al. (2017a) at a 10×10 km spatial resolution, covering 633 grid cells in Denmark (Figures 1A, 1C, 
1D). Average biodiversity importance scores (Figure 1B), is based on species in the national Red 
Data Book and expert judgments (Ejrnæs et al. 2014). 
 
The spatial distribution of broadleaved forest cover is not available at the resolution given in Figure 
1. We have used the 10 Danish bioregions to represent the spatial distribution of forest productivity. 
In the initial analysis, we have assumed that forest owners with broadleaved forest of oak, beech or 
alder will exist across the country. We have used the capital value for mature forests of each of the 
three species in each of the bioregions to represent the opportunity cost of permanent harvesting 
rights. For oak, this is defined as the capital value of a 105-year-old stand. We have included a 20 
per cent variability randomly to allow for local variability in ages and productivity. For beech, we 
have used an 85-year-old stand to represent maturity and have used 20 per cent variability in capital 
values. The capital value of alder stands at 55 years has been used to represent the value of less 
economically productive broadleaved areas. Again, we have used a 20 per cent variability in 
economic value. We use a 3 per cent discount rate. 
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Figure 6.1: Spatial distribution of forest area (A), biodiversity importance score (B), number of private owners (C) and private 
forestland (D) in Denmark at 10×10 km resolution. 
 
 
6.3 Results 
The accumulated offer curve, using design A, is shown in Figure 6.2 (blue curve). This assumes that 
the contracts are allocated based on a discriminatory reverse auction and that the participants are 
equally likely to submit an area of the three different species and reveal their true opportunity costs. 
With a budget of 90 million DKK, harvesting rights on approximately 1100 hectares is purchased. 
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Using a first rejected price auction (Design B) increases the costs due to the relatively steep cost 
curve. With a budget of 90 million DKK just under 800 hectares are signed up. Even if forest 
owners offer the harvesting right at 50 per cent above their opportunity costs, a discriminatory 
reverse auction is more cost-effective. Figure 6.2 (green curve) illustrates an offer curve where the 
forest owners provide offers 10 per cent above their opportunity costs. Just below 600 hectares of 
the contracted area are alder forests following Design B. 
 
Figure 6.2: Total costs of auction illustration. Design A discriminatory pricing (blue). Design B first rejected price (red). Design 
A discriminatory pricing including 10 per cent information rent (green). 
 
The accumulated offer curve, using Design C, is shown in Figure 6.3. This assumes that the 
contracts are allocated based on points where 50 per cent of the weight is given to the price and 50 
per cent is given to the biodiversity score of the area. It is a discriminatory reverse auction and it is 
assumed that the participants are equally likely to submit an area of the three different species and 
reveal their true opportunity costs. With a budget of 90 million DKK, harvesting rights on 
approximately 1,000 hectares is purchased. Just below 600 hectares of the contracted area are alder 
forests, the same area as the areas contracted under Design A and B. This means that due to the 
large difference in opportunity costs of the three species, the ecopoints are not altering the 
composition of the types of areas contracted under the scheme. 
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Figure 6.3: The total cost of the reverse auction using Design C. 
 
 
Dividing the auction into two sub-auctions with an allocated budget of 50 per cent for each sub-
auction gives two accumulated offer-curves (Figure 6.4). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: The total cost of the reverse auction using Design D. 
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All offers for contracts of alder area are successful with a budget constraint of 45 million DKK and 
640 hectares are contracted. 415 hectares of forest dominated by oak and beech forest are contracted 
under this arrangement. 
 
6.4 Conclusions from the simulations and the implications for the design 
The analysis reported in this section serves as an illustration of the influence of some of the key 
considerations for a cost-effective design. Firstly, the large variation in capital value of forest areas 
mainly due to species and age composition is likely to determine the distribution of the offers. This 
is likely to be much higher in reality than by these averaged measures +/- 20 per cent. If the species 
distribution of the contracted areas is an important success parameter, it should be taken into 
account in the design phase. Ignoring this aspect is likely to lead to contracts only representing the 
less valuable forest types in market terms. Secondly, the analysis illustrates a system for including 
the biological value of the areas into the ranking of offers. Given the weight between offer and 
biological score (assumed equal weight in the analysis) and distribution of biodiversity values, the 
results indicate that the distribution of capital values of the offers is the determining factor for the 
contracted areas. The variation in biodiversity scores and spatial variation in productive potential of 
the forest is less influential, due to the fact that each bioregion is only represented by the average 
productive potential. Having said that, these illustrations are merely illustrations of principles and 
rest on strong simplifying assumptions. 
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7. Barriers for participation 
It is essential for tenders and reverse auctions to reach an adequate level of participation from 
landowners in order to obtain the desired environmental effect and to secure competition, which is 
fundamental for minimizing the potential of information rent and thus securing cost efficiency. The 
more landowners that participate in a tender by making offers for conservation of their land, the 
larger a selection of offers the environmental agency will have to choose among. High participation 
is instrumental in securing that the environmental agency has an oversupply of offers either in terms 
of the conservation target or in terms of the budget for conservation. So ultimately, the 
attractiveness of the mechanism for landowners is of great importance for success. At the same 
time, Whitten et al. (2013) note that high participation naturally leads to higher costs of the 
environmental agency in terms of more site visits and administration in general. 
 
But landowners in general have limited experience and knowledge about auctions, the involved 
process of bidding, and the competition they will face (Rolfe et al. 2017), which might reduce their 
willingness to participate in the auction. Looking at experience reported in the literature, this 
chapter aims at identifying potential barriers that may prevent forest owners from entering an 
auction, and initiatives that could promote participation. We present a 3-stage framework, which in 
detail is inspired by a framework developed by Whitten et al. (2013) and we look at how the 
different stages in the process of implementing tenders can impact the participation of landowners. 
We supplement with experiences from other sources including experiences related to 
implementation and adoption of the agri-environmental schemes. The boundaries between the 
different stages in the framework are not sharp as more of the factors influencing participation 
could belong to more than one of the stages. 
 
7.1. Stage 1: Alignment 
This stage refers to how landowners are aligned with the required conservation action(s) dictated by 
the conservation scheme. This includes their awareness, with respect to the degree of knowledge 
and the amount of time they had knowledge about the scheme, knowledge about how the 
conservation action will deliver the desired environmental outcome and whether they consider the 
actions appropriate. In a review of 23 studies of agri-environmental conservation programs, 
Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) find awareness of the environmental problem to be one of the few 
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universal factors to affect adoption of the programme. In addition, Wossink and Van Wenum (2003) 
find that the lack of farmer’s awareness of an incentive programme offered for biodiversity 
conservation hampered participation. Awareness also implies that the landowners find the 
conservation strategy of potentially practical relevance (Pannel et al. 2006) and if landowners do 
not consider the projected conservation action as appropriate, it will also negatively affect their 
willingness to participate (Wossink and Van Wenum 2003). Morris et al. (2000) found that farmers 
demonstrated resistance to agro-environmental schemes, often associated with objection in principle 
to perceived constraints on the freedom to farm, reinforced by lack of knowledge of the scheme. 
 
The previous call for a fixed price conservation scheme (Miljøministeriet 2016) using untouched 
forest as the conservation action and the research results published within the last couple of years 
(see e.g. Pedersen et al. 2016) including the surrounding debate and media attention would probably 
mean that most forest owners are aware of the untouched forest as a conservation strategy.  
However, a partnership with forest owner associations should be considered in order to raise 
awareness but also to facilitate that forest owners find untouched forest to be an appropriate mean to 
conserve biodiversity. Awareness campaigns and demonstration projects could also serve to raise 
awareness and knowledge. 
 
7.2 Stage 2: Opportunity and engagement 
In this context, opportunity should be interpreted as the relative advantage for the landowners to 
participate in the conservation scheme, and is defined as the landowners’ perception of the marginal 
benefits relative to the marginal costs. In addition to the opportunity costs of leaving the forest 
untouched, the transaction costs related to making an offer are also relevant in the perspective. This 
is strongly related to engagement, which covers the communication, information exchange and 
preparation of offers related to the participation of reverse auctions (Whitten et al. 2013). 
Engagement also interacts with landowners’ perception of eligibility for the conservation scheme, 
where a strict eligibility caused by e.g. segmentation as described in section 4.2.1 potentially could 
decrease participation. Another factor associated with eligibility is information about the parameters 
considered when evaluating offers. As previously mentioned, Connor et al. (2008) points out that 
rent seeking could be minimized if the evaluation parameters are not fully disclosed. This, on the 
43 
 
other hand, might have an adverse effect on participation. The yardstick price algorithms described 
above might provide a better balance between transparency and participation. 
An important factor is the opportunity cost as perceived by the landowners, which includes both the 
direct and the indirect cost caused by the conservation action. 
 
In the case of leaving a forest area untouched, there is uncertainty about e.g. draining of the forest 
stand on grounds of neighbouring plots, or how hunting rights and income would be affected.  Also, 
obligations to clearing established access ways for recreation could influence the perceived costs. 
The better these possible uncertainties are handled and communicated, the clearer a perception the 
landowner will have of the opportunity. 
 
Transaction costs arising from arranging the transfer of rights or land between landowner and the 
environmental agency, e.g. the costs related to offer preparation and submission of an offer is also 
of relevance. Mettepenningen et al. (2009) explore farmers’ transaction costs entering an agri-
environmental scheme and find the costs to be significant due to increased administrative workload 
combined with the fact that farmers in general appear to be averse to administration. Ducos et al. 
(2009) also find transaction costs to impede participation, and Ruto and Garrod (2009) find similar 
results in a choice experiment study based on farmers in 10 countries across the EU. They also 
found that farmers were less likely to join contracts with long duration and small levels of 
flexibility. Broch and Vedel (2012) also found that flexibility in terms of short contracts or being 
able to cancel the contract was important features for landowners. This indicates that contracts and 
application procedures would benefit from simplicity in terms of participation rates, which is 
confirmed by Falconer and Whitby (2010) who advocate scheme transparency and simplicity of 
schemes in order to reduce landowners’ need to pay for professional advice. Furthermore, 
participation is often required within a reasonably short timeframe, which further emphasises the 
need for simplification and clarity. 
 
When setting aside forest for biodiversity protection, the timeframe is by nature rather long, if not 
infinite. This obviously conflicts with creating short and flexible contracts. Falconer and Whitby 
(2010) suggest schemes where landowners can opt in or out of specific requirements in order to 
simplify the tender process. A few options could be considered to strike a balance between 
simplicity and flexibility. Some landowners would perhaps be reluctant to make commitments that 
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future generations would have to comply with. One opportunity could be leaving a window of 
opportunity to withdraw from the contract after a number of years, which has been found to have 
great importance for landowners (Broch and Vedel 2012). This would require thorough 
consideration about how the compensation should be adjusted in relation to interim growth, changes 
in timber prices, and interest rates etc., before it is returned from landowner to agency. Another 
opportunity could be allowing a pre-conservation harvest of timber. This flexibility could increase 
participation but would demand careful consideration of how this harvest would affect the 
biodiversity on location, and how it should be taken into account in relation to the selection of 
offers. Furthermore, the implications for biodiversity of pre-conservation harvest are likely to vary 
greatly between areas. 
 
7.3 Stage 3: Contracting and post-participation 
Contracting covers, the formal agreement between landowner and agency, and many of the 
considerations above about flexibility and transaction costs apply here as well. Whitten et al. (2003) 
also stress the importance of communication between landowner and agency throughout the 
contracting phase. This should also continue after the contracting phase with respect to general 
administration monitoring issues. Post-participation also relates to potential landowners, who did 
not offer their land for conservation, and landowners being unsuccessful in the selection of offers.  
Siebert et al. (2006) find that social networks in the local community of landowners play a 
significant role, with special importance to how the network has experienced negotiations with an 
agency. Therefore, unsuccessful participants with a positive experience about the process could be 
valuable in obtaining sufficient participation in future auction. 
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